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Abstract. Crowdfunding is a fast developing method of projects finance mobilization. 
However, weakness of trust and the associated problem of information asymmetry 
constrain risk sharing investments as well as equity crowdfunding. Reputation mechanism 
is one of the newest ways to address asymmetric information issue in web-based social 
networks. A reputational mechanism has been designed and named “Fame” in this paper 
specifically for equity crowdfunding systems to eliminate moral hazard and reduce 
asymmetric information. The term “Fame” is meant to capture the qualitative aspects of 
reputation such as trustworthiness, credibility, reliability of every individual member of an 
equity crowdfunding system. Fame1 is systematic, countable and computable (implicit and 
explicit) reputation monitoring mechanism.A game theory approach is employed using two 
different games: “without Fame” and “with Fame” games, to show that a “with Fame” 
crowdfunding game leads to better results. Moreover, net aggregate surplus in “with Fame” 
crowdfunding is larger than “without Fame” crowdfunding system.  
Keywords. Crowdfunding, Equity crowdfunding, Reputation mechanism, Mechanism of 
fame, Information asymmetry, Risk sharing. 
JEL. C70, D82, D85, D91, G23. 
 
1. Introduction 
rowdfunding is defined as an investment conducted by a group of 
individuals (crowd), instead of the traditional financial intermediaries. 
Crowdfunding is taking place because of direct communication between 
entrepreneurs and investors using an internet platform (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 
2010). In crowdfunding, each individual in the crowd provides a small amount 
instead of large amounts provided by a small group of experienced investors 
(Voorbraak, 2011). Crowdfunding has the potential to increase entrepreneurship by 
expanding the pool of investors from whom funds can be raised beyond the 
traditional loop of owners, relatives and venture capitalists (Ordanini et al., 2011). 
Beside other benefits, this method of mobilizing finance has the potential to 
accelerate and expand efforts at financial inclusion. 
Equity-based crowd funding 
Equity-based crowdfunding is a new and different method of Fintech to 
encourage investment in the real sector of economy to increase employment and 
income. This type of crowdfunding involves an inexpensive way of issuance of 
shares through the internet, where investors can acquire stock in corporations for a 
small amount of money, with a claim over the company’s future cash flow. It has 
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proved to be a viable form of corporate finance, enabling companies to access 
funding for projects that have failed to mobilize funds from angel investors, 
government resources, friends or families (Ahlers et al., 2012). Crowd investing 
facilitates the financing of corporate growth and innovation. 
Information Asymmetry 
There are two types of crowdfunding; debt and equity. Here-to-fore, the former 
has dominated the latter due to specific and sensitive risks associated with equity 
crowdfunding. The main risks are fraud (the money is not used for the declared 
purpose), loss due to project failure andliquidity constrain as the most important 
drivers of moral hazard and operational risks with information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry arises when one party in a transaction has more or superior 
information than the other party (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Asymmetric information 
in financial markets includesadverse selection and moral hazard, both of which 
lead toincreasedmonitoring costs Ricardo N. Bebczuk (2003). 
A broad range of categories in market design have been deployed in 
crowdfunding and other online market settings in an attempt at reducing 
information-related market failures. These are signalling, screening, rules and 
regulations, collateral and guarantees, due diligence, and enhanced reputation 
monitoring (called “Fame” in this paper). 
Reputation mechanism 
One of the newest ways of solving the problem of information asymmetry is 
reputation mechanism. The primary objective of a reputation mechanisms is to 
enable efficient transactions in communities where cooperation is compromised by 
post-contractual opportunism or information asymmetries. If the community 
follows a norm by punishing traders with adverse track record of behaviour, by 
refusing to deal with them, and if the present value of punishment exceeds the 
gains from cheating, then the threat of public revelation of a trader’s cheating 
behaviour in the current round provides rational traders with sufficient incentives 
to cooperate (Dellarocas, 2015).  
A reputationmonitoring mechanism has been designed in this paper specifically 
for equity crowdfunding system to reduce asymmetric information. The role of 
reputation is important as a mechanism for establishing trust to address the risk of 
fraud in online transactions. While there are various mechanisms to deal with 
fraud, reputation is one of the best and more effective candidates. 
Fame 
The enhanced reputation mechanism designed and presented in this paper is 
called “Fame”. “Fame” refers to the credibility of every individual who is a 
member of a crowdfunding system. Fame is systematic, countable and computable 
(implicit and explicit) reputation, a clear signal to other members of the social 
network of crowdfunding. This credibility is formed for all users of the system 
based on their banking (financial) credit, social credit, participation (activities) 
history, and track record of their success in previous transactions. Fame has been 
innovated in order to represent and monitor the reputation of the users in the social 
network of crowdfunding system. As a result, “Fame” is the reference framework 
for individuals’ decisions in the fields of investment, loan payment, being a third-
part guarantor of others, and any other transaction in the system. The credibility 
points assigned to each financial transaction will be determined through the 
policies and procedures of the crowdfunding system set by the owners and policy 
makers within the credit-scoring framework. Fame is the outcome of this credit-
scoring process and is consequently, influencedby each transaction of every single 
user. 
In this research “Fame” is a general function of four parameters: 
 
𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
 
As is demonstrated in following sections of this paper, “Fame” can be designed 
as optimal reputation mechanism for equity crowdfunding.For this purpose we use 
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mechanism design theory. Mechanism design is a field in economics and game 
theory that employs an engineering approach for designing economic mechanisms, 
or incentives structures, toward desired objectives in strategic settings in which 
players act rationally. Since the approach starts at the end of the game, then goes 
backwards, it is sometimes known as reverse game theory. 
 
2. Mechanism design 
The mechanism employed in this paper is aVickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism 
(VCG). Bidders offer bids based on their valuations of the elements of the 
transaction, without knowing the bids of other people taking part in the auction. 
The auction system arranges the items in an acceptable manner: it charges each 
person the damage they cause to other bidders. Moreover, it provides bidders 
with an incentive to bid their true valuations, by ensuring that the best strategy for 
each bidder is to bid their true valuations of the items. It is a generalization of 
a Vickrey auction for multiple items. In this paper, the mechanism is designed in 
normal situation (without “Fame”) firstly. In the following, the mechanism of 
crowdfunding including” Fame” is designed. The results of two mechanisms (with 
“Fame” and without “Fame”) are then compared. 
Utility function of entrepreneur and funder with “Fame” and without “Fame” 
As mentioned, there are two types of players in the system: entrepreneurs 
(principals) and funders (agents). Payoff of funders and entrepreneurs in the 
mechanism is the utility of the project. The main assumptions for both models are 
as follows: 
 The number of potential funders and entrepreneurs in the equity 
crowdfunding system are theoretically unlimited, and there is no limitation in the 
number and share of funders to fund a project.  
 
𝑁 =  1,2,3,…… , 𝑛          (1) 
 
N= number of funders in crowd funding system 
 The entrepreneur presents his/her project in the system in three parts: 
1- The details of the project including the nature of project, the timeline, the 
business plan of project and most importantly the expected return of project 
including forecasting direct yield, indirect awards and so on. 
2- The minimum pledge level of each funder to participate in the project (p) 
3- The target level of investment which is needed (T); target level is equal to 
the cost of running the project. 
 There are two probabilities for the project, represented by K; if K=1, 
project starts with αprobability. 
If K=0 project does not start, with probability of (1 − α) 
              
𝐾 =  1,0             (2) 
 
K= social choice function 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 =  
K = 1, 𝑃 = 𝛼
K = 0, 𝑃 = (1 − 𝛼)
        (3) 
 
 Starting the project (K=1) the entrepreneur needs to collect the funds for 
the project to target level (T). If 𝑛1 funders contribute𝑡 unit of funds in a project, 
the necessary conditionto start is equation (4). 
 
𝑛1 . 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇                (4) 
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T is the minimum amount that the entrepreneur needs to begin the project but if 
the collective funds are more than T, the entrepreneur has the opportunity to use 
this extra amount to improve the quality of the project. Therefore, if the mobilized 
fund for the project is more than T, the quality of project can be better than the 
primary standard assumption. 
 Some funders from an infinite number of funders agree to take part in the 
project. We assume probability of this participation is  Binomially Distributed as in  
(5): 
 
ρ 𝑛1: 𝑖𝑓  𝑘 = 1 =  
𝑁
𝑛1
 𝛼𝑛1 1 − 𝛼 𝑁−𝑛1      (5) 
 
ρ= the probability of n funder that agreefor the project to start. 
 The mechanism is a weak balance as  𝑡𝑖 < 0
𝑛1
𝑖=1 ; sum of payoff is not 
positive. In addition, the source of payment is payments of funders and there is no 
other external source of funds. This is our assumption of Mechanism Efficiency. 
 The way to understand the types of players in this mechanism is direct. 
Utility function of player i is a function of his/her subjective value of the project 
and his/her contribution to the project. 
 To make our equation simpler, it is assumed that the strategy of each player 
is not influenced by other players; meaning that each player has a dominant 
strategy. 
 All players are rational and they have individual rationality; meaning that 
negative utility in non-permissible. 
 The result of the mechanism should prepare the situation in which at least 
one player improves his/her status. These assumptions should allow search for 
Pareto optimal equilibrium. 
 
3. Mechanism of crowdfunding without fame 
To design the mechanism of our crowdfunding system, we use VCG 
mechanism. As mentioned, there are two types of players in the system: 
entrepreneurs (principals) and funders (agents). Payoff of funders in the mechanism 
is specified by their utility of the project. This utility function is a function of K 
which is social choice function, value of the project for each funder and the cost of 
funding for each funder are described by equation (6), 
 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑈 𝐾, 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖          (6) 
 
Subjective value of each funder is a function of his/her type2 and the payoff of 
project. Payoff can be an equity/goods which will be developed during the project 
or a share in ownership of the project or a share of ownership of the end product of 
the project. Equation (7) 
 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑧            (7) 
𝜃 = 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠         
z= the final production after running the project 
 
So, the utility function of each funder is as equation (8) 
 
 𝑢𝑖 = 𝐾 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖           (8) 
 
 
2 Players have specific preferences which are actually their private information and is named by 
“type” here. 
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Therefore, payoff of all funders is the sum of utilities of all participant funders 
as inequation (9): 
 
 𝑢𝑖 = 𝐾. 𝜌. 𝑁.   𝑣𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖 
𝑛1
𝐼=1
𝑛1
𝑖=1        (9) 
Since we assumed individual rationality, the utility function of players should 
not be negative. So, we have equation (10): 
 
𝑢𝑖 > 0
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
      𝑢𝑖 > 0
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
     𝑣𝑖 > 𝑡𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
yields
    𝐾 = 1               (10) 
 
K=1 means the utility of this project for that funder is positive (𝑣𝑖 > 𝑡𝑖) because 
his/her preference is positive payoff. Accordingly, if 𝑢𝑖 > 0 then aggregate of 𝑢𝑖  is 
also larger than zero, implying that the collective utility function of all funders is 
positive. The explanation is that when a project is funded, it can be shown that 
subjective value3 of each funder is more than cost of funding for that funder, and 
accumulative utility of the group of funders increases. Therefore, funders vote 
positivelyon this project and the minimum target of funds for this project can be 
mobilized. 
On the other side of the game, there exists an entrepreneur whose purpose is to 
maximize the profit of the project (value maximization) 
 
π = 𝑇𝑅 − 𝑇𝐶                                 (11) 
π = Profit of entrepreneur     TR= total revenue     TC= total cost 
 
The return of the project for entrepreneur is from funds which can be equal or 
more than target level of project. TC is the announced target amount of funds 
which is needed for project to start. 
 
𝑇𝑅 𝑇 ≥ 𝑇𝐶                                (12) 
 
If returns to the project (sum of the funds) are equal to the cost of project, net 
profit of project for entrepreneur is zero. If funds are more that T, net profit will be 
positive. 
 
π = 𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇𝐶
𝑛1
𝑖=1                  (13) 
π =  
π = 0,   if    𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑡𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1 = TC
π > 0 , 𝑖𝑓    𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑡𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1 > 𝑇𝐶
                  (14) 
 
If the payoff of entrepreneur is equal to zero, the probability of cheating in the 
project increases. Therefore, there is the risk of cheating or fraud with this “without 
fame” mechanism. 
 
4. Mechanism of crowdfunding with “fame” 
In this mechanism again the players are funders and entrepreneurs. The payoff 
of the funders is their utility of the projects. All players are rational with positive 
utility. 
 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑈 𝐾, 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖                    (15) 
 
The subjective value of funders in this mechanism is a function of funder types, 
final payoff, and the “Fame” of the project. Since the “Fame” of the project can be 
 
3The subjective value advances the idea that the value of a good is determined by the importance that 
an acting individual places on a good for the achievement of his desired ends. 
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considered as a function of the “Fame” of the entrepreneur, subjective value is a 
function of entrepreneur’s “Fame” as inequation (16), 
 
𝑣 = 𝑣 𝜃𝑖 ,𝑍𝑖 , 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒                    (16) 
 
As “Fame” can be positive, zero or negative, we have equation (17) 
 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 
 
 
 
 
 𝑎)     𝑖𝑓    𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 0   
𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑛
   𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖
𝑏)    𝑖𝑓     𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 < 0    
𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑛
   𝑣𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖
𝑐)    𝑖𝑓      𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 > 0    
𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑛
   𝑣𝑖 > 𝑣𝑖
              (17) 
 
A) In time t1, entrepreneur enters crowdfunding system but he/she does not 
have any “Fame” yet. In such circumstances, the funders' reaction is identical to 
those in the crowdfunding mechanism without “Fame”. Hence, payoff and 
Aggregate Net Surplus are completely like “no Fame” crowdfunding system. 
However, the difference lies in the entrepreneur's tendency to collect “Fame” for 
himself/herself for the future. As a result, these types of entrepreneurs typically 
provide better payoffs in their proposal and are also intent on succeeding in 
projects they undertake in order to collect good feedbacks and enhance 
their“Fame”. However, funders usually do not trust newcomers. Thus, newcomers 
have to start from small projects to collect “Fame” in the system. Still, there is 
another alternative for newcomers to enhance their “Fame” by bringing banking or 
social credit from outside ofthe system. It can be expected that with Fame” 
crowdfunding systems, the risk of cheating, fraud and failure decreases even for 
newcomers simply because they would be more cautious about their “Fame”. 
Therefore, the outcome of new projects can be more successful with such 
mechanism. 
B) If the “Fame” of any entrepreneur is negative, it is an obvious signal to all 
players in the system to be alert to potential moral hazard and fraud risks. An 
entrepreneur with negative “Fame” can be defined as a person who has a poor or 
unsuccessful track record of activities. Funders can read details of the history of 
entrepreneur to know the reasons for their poor “Fame”. The infamous 
entrepreneur might have cheated or defrauded or had some failure with 
implementation of earlier projects thereby indicating that he is notto be entrusted 
with the funds of a project.Another reason to avoid partnership with an infamous 
entrepreneur is the negative impact of a failed project on funders' “Fame”. If a 
funder funds an unsuccessful project, his/her “Fame” will decrease accordingly. 
Hence, very few funders are interested in investing in a project with an infamous 
entrepreneur. Hence the number of failed projects and infamous entrepreneurs will 
decrease in the system. 
C) Third and the most probable case is one in which entrepreneurs have 
positive “Fame”. Greater “Fame” signifies better history of activities, success in 
previous projects, and more social credit, all of which contribute to attracting 
funders to fund famous entrepreneurs’ projects. Funders can predict a successful 
project with less risk from a highly positive “Fame”. In addition, the entrepreneur 
does his/her best to complete the project. Success in the project can enhance the 
“Fame” of both the entrepreneur and the funders. Indeed, in synergy, they help 
each other to sufficiently fund and efficiently manage the project.Funders in this 
situation are looking for famous entrepreneurs with highest return. An example is 
ebay.com or booking.com where users usually look for hotels with best feedbacks 
and lower prices. 
Subjective value of the funders is a function of payoff and “Fame”. Therefore, 
the total payoff for a funder in a successful project is more than “no Fame” 
investment. 
  
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 5(1), O. Torabi , & A. Mirakhor,  p.32-41. 
38 
∂𝑣𝑖 
∂𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒
> 0                    (18) 
 
The utility function of the entrepreneur is also a function of income/cost as well 
as additional “Fame” of the project. If he/she can succeed in the project, there is 
gain in terms of additional “Fame”. 
 
π = π 𝑇𝑅, 𝑇𝐶, ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒                   (20) 
∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑏                    (21) 
 
Therefore, the “Fame” of the project impacts crowdfunding mechanism in two 
parts: 
1. Utility function of funders are impacted by “Fame”, so valuation of a project 
by funders is different as equation (22) and (23) 
 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑧, 𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒                    (22) 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒                    (23) 
 
So, the utility function is represented by equation (24): 
 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝐾 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖                      (24) 
 
Funding in a crowdfunding system is by crowd of funders so sum of the utilities 
is as below: 
 
 𝑢𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1 = 𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.   𝑣𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1                  (25) 
 𝑢𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1 = 𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.   𝑣𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒) − 𝑡𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1                           (26) 
 𝑢𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1 =  𝑢𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1 + 𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 
𝑛1
𝑖=1                 (27) 
 
Projects with zero “Fame” or negative “Fame” are rare. Moreover, the negative 
“Fame” could result in a negative utility function in equation (27). 
 We assume a positive “Fame” for designing the mechanism, that is:𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 > 
0. Therefore, “Fame” has a positive impact on the utility function,  𝑢𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1 >
 𝑢𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1 . Thus, the payoff of funders in a “with-Fame crowdfunding” system is 
higher than in the conventional system. 
2. As mentioned, entrepreneurs know about the impact of their behavior on their 
“Fame” as the history of their “Fame” is available to all funders in the system. As a 
result, even one failure can be troublesome for a famous entrepreneur and thus 
potentially reduce the amount of funding for his/her future projects. Therefore, a 
high effort and energy by entrepreneur to succeed would be expected. Payoff is 
“Fame” + income – costs, as below: 
 
𝜋 = 𝑇𝑅 − 𝑇𝐶                               (28) 
𝜋 = 𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇𝐶
𝑛1
𝑖=1 + ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒                 (29) 
𝜋 = π + ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒                   (30) 
 
An entrepreneur tries to achieve success in order to increase his/her “Fame”. 
This implies that, in a deficit situation, he/she prefers to invest by himself/herself 
or rather try harder with more energy to succeed. Generally, we can assume that a 
famous player selects the strategy of success. So, we can predict that equation (31) 
is always positive. 
 
π =  
π > 0,   𝑖𝑓    𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑡𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1 < 𝑇𝐶    𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 ∶  ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 > 0
π > 0 , 𝑖𝑓    𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑡𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1 > 𝑇𝐶    𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 ∶  ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 > 0
               (31) 
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The result is presented in the following Table 1: 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the Fame Crowdfunding Pay-off & Crowdfunding 
Net aggregate surplus Entrepreneur pay-off Funders pay-off  
𝑆 = 𝜌. 𝑛1 .  𝑡 1 − 𝑛 +  𝑣𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
 − 𝑇𝐶 π = 𝐾. 𝑁.𝜌.  𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇𝐶
𝑛1
𝑖=1
  𝑢𝑖 = 𝐾. 𝜌. 𝑁.  𝑣𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖 
𝑛1
𝐼=1
𝑛1
𝑖=1
 Crowdfunding 
𝑆 = 𝑆 + ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 +  𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 
𝑛1
𝑖=1
 𝜋 = π + ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒  𝑢𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1
=  𝑢𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
+ 𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌. 𝑓(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒)
𝑛1
𝑖=1
 
 
Crowdfunding 
with “Fame” 
𝑆 > 𝑆 𝜋 > π  𝑢𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1
>  𝑢𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
 Result 
Crowdfunding with “Fame” 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 > 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 Comparison 
 
It can be seen that the mechanism of crowdfunding with “Fame” produces a 
better result compared to “no Fame” mechanism for players on both sides of 
transaction. Some of the reasons are: 
 The utility of players in “Fame” crowdfunding system is higher than one 
without “Fame”. Therefore, the motivation of players to enter this system is 
stronger and hence the funding will be larger in this system. 
 As there is history and track record in the system, the risk of cheating, 
frauds, moral hazards, hence the probability of failure will be lower in the system. 
 There is clear signaling in this mechanism for players which is both 
demonstrable and performance-based.As a result, information asymmetry 
decreases in this system.  
 Entrepreneurs try harder to succeed in their project in order to gain more 
“Fame”. This implies that even in cases where funds fall short of what is needed, 
entrepreneurs may devise ways and means of finishing the project successfully to 
avoid damage to their “Fame”. It can be generally stated that success would be the 
dominant strategy of the entrepreneurs.  
 Success in the project can enhance “Fame” for both entrepreneur and 
funders. Indeed, both help each other to sufficiently fund by and efficiently manage 
the project. 
Aggregate net surplus 
Aggregate Net Surplus (ANS) is the aggregate of payoff for all players in the 
mechanism. Technically, it is the aggregate of profit of all stakeholders in a 
mechanism. In the present study, the stakeholders of a crowdfunding mechanism 
are assumed to be funders and entrepreneurs.  
The Pareto optimality condition is satisfied only if the ANS of the mechanism 
can be maximized. Equations of ANS in the crowdfunding system encompasses 
three parts: ANSof a “Fameless” crowdfunding system, changes in the “Fame” of 
funders and the “Fame” function of entrepreneur as in equation (32) 
 
𝑆 = 𝑆 + ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 +  𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 
𝑛1
𝑖=1                 (32) 
  
ANS in the “Fame” system is higher than the one without “Fame”. 
 
𝑆 ≥ 𝑆
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
      
𝑖𝑓       𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 > 0  ,    𝑆 > 𝑆
  𝑖𝑓       𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 0  ,    𝑆 > 𝑆
                   (33) 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 0 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 
→  ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 > 0 𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 
 
5. Summary of the result 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that a reputationmonitoring mechanism 
can provide a key to reducing information asymmetry. Implementation of 
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reputation monitoring is difficult in a real market as there are technical needs like 
credit scoring platform, reputation indexes, and comprehensive solution to include 
all users. Crowdfunding is a web 2.0-based platform, which is actually a closed 
system. Therefore, the implementation of a reputation monitoring mechanism at the 
heart of this system is appropriate (as it can be seen in ebay.com and 
booking.com). We introduce our reputation index as Fame to make it more 
comprehensive. “Fame” is a function of users’ banking (financial) credit, social 
credit, participation (activities) history, and their success in previous transactions. 
As can be seen in this research, the result of utility function for both funders and 
entrepreneurs is improved in a with-”Fame” mechanism. 
As for entrepreneur: 
 
𝜋 = π + ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 
 
And for funder: 
 
 ui 
n1
i=1
=  ui
n1
i=1
+ K. N. ρ.  f fame 
n1
i=1
 
 
Therefore: 
 
𝜋 > π   And     𝑢𝑖 
𝑛1
𝑖=1 >  𝑢𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1  
 
Furthermore, aggregate net surplus in this research represents the aggregate of 
pay-offs of all stakeholders in a community and, as can be seen below, aggregate 
net surplus increase of all users shows manifold increases in the system. 
 
𝑆 = 𝜌. 𝑛1 .  𝑡 1 − 𝑛 +  𝑣𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
 − 𝑇𝐶 
 
and  
𝑆 = 𝑆 + ∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 +  𝐾. 𝑁. 𝜌.  𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑒 
𝑛1
𝑖=1
 
 
But 𝑆 > 𝑆  so  
Aggregate Crowdfunding with-Fame 
payoff > 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓. 
Therefore, mathematically, the tendency of community to collaborate in with-
Fame crowdfunding system rises as compared with without-Fame system. 
 
6. Implementation 
Implementation of reputation mechanism in a social network is not difficult. 
There are many popular websites that have used the concept of reputation in their 
platform like Google, eBay, Booking.com, TripAdvisor. However, the reputation 
mechanism could be based on explicit feedbacks or implicit analysis. One of the 
main differences of our findings in this research with other recent innovations and 
implemented websites is the importance of defining a reputation index (“Fame” 
index) for all users of a social network to make the reputation countable and 
systematically useable. For example, as can be seen in eBay; buyers usually 
provide feedbacks for sellers. The identity of buyers and their reputation is not 
clear. In case of booking.com, also the identity and reputation of the guests who 
rate the hotels are not known.  
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Generally, in a social network and especially in a crowdfunding platform, 
defining “Fame” for every user (funders and entrepreneurs) automatically increases 
the significance and comprehensiveness of “Fame” in the community. In this case, 
all users will be sensitive to the consequence of all their activities, even those who 
vote or blog in a social network. Consequently, it can be an effective reputation 
mechanism in a community by means of universality and reach. “Fame” not only 
decreases the information asymmetry but also, if “Fame” mechanism can properly 
be implemented in a social network, it can be shown mathematically that aggregate 
net surplus will be increased in the community.  
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